Ten years after the initial Climate Change Convention from Rio in 1992, the developed world is likely to ratify the Kyoto Protocol which has been celebrated as a milestone in climate protection. Standard economic theory, however, casts doubt that Kyoto will go beyond symbolic policy. In this paper we show that the final concretion of the Kyoto Protocol obeys the theoretical prediction: Kyoto more or less boils down to business-as-usual without significant compliance costs to ratifying parties. JEL classification: D58, Q43, Q58
Introduction
In 2002, ten years after the Climate Convention was adopted at the Rio Earth Summit, the world community is expected to implement a legally binding international agreement on From the stance of standard economic theory, such an agreement with potentially large economic adjustment costs to industrialized nations would be hard to explain. Climate protection constitutes the case of voluntarily providing a pure global public good which entails serious incentive problems. In fact, according to standard game theory, no country should have an incentive to abate greenhouse gas emissions above its non-cooperative level.
In the short-to medium-run, the latter can be identified as the business-as-usual emission level, since substantial adjustment costs occur instantly but benefits will only arise in the far distant future.
In this paper, we investigate whether the final outcome from 10 years of climate change negotiations obeys the theoretical prediction of standard economic theory. We show that recent changes to the Kyoto Protocol in fact seem to boil down climate policy to business-as-usual without any compliance costs for participating countries. At second glance, however, it appears that uncertainties on market power and future economic development may turn the Kyoto Protocol into an agreement with effective emission abatement and economic costs. Based on quantitative evidence from a large-scale multi-region model of global trade and energy use, we argue that the predictive power of standard economic theory still holds, because the costs arising from these uncertainties are rather negligible.
The Kyoto Protocol at first view: What theory predicts!
Climate protection poses the problem of providing a global public good. Each country has to decide on how much abatement of greenhouse gas emissions it wants to undertake. In the absence of any supranational authority, countries behave non-cooperatively, i.e. each country decides according to a comparison of its own benefits from abatement and its own costs of abatement.
Let there be n countries and let i q denote the abatement level of country i. Global abatement, then, simply amounts to ( )
In this framework, non-cooperative behavior simply means that countries try to maximize their own net benefit from abatement. The first order condition to the optimization problem is given by i i B C ′ ′ = , i.e. countries choose abatement levels that equate their own marginal benefits from abatement and their own marginal abatement costs. In the literature, this solution is referred to as the non-cooperative equilibrium of the n-countries global public good game or the Nash-Cournot outcome (Finus 2000) . The non-cooperative equilibrium is suboptimal from a global planner point of view, because the decentralized national decision maker does not recognize the positive externalities spread on all other countries by its own abatement action. Furthermore, each country has an incentive to free ride on abatement in other countries without contributing by its own, which leads to the well-known prisoner-dilemma situation in climate policy.
For the purpose of our paper, it is necessary to quantify the compliance costs a country is willing to accept in the non-cooperative solution. These costs can be assumed to be (close to) zero. The reason is that for the problem of mitigating global warming, abatement measures undertaken today will not unfold a stabilizing climate effect until far in the future. Hence, benefits from climate protection will accrue to future generations, while costs have to be carried by the current generation. In formal terms,
and hence
rational government, thus, will not enter an international agreement which is likely to impose significant costs. Prima facie, the effective outcome of the Kyoto Protocol -after 5 years of negotiation -backs the theoretical proposition. Table 1 provides the quantitative evidence.
The Kyoto Protocol negotiated in 1997 during the third Conference of Parties (COP3), requires industrialized countries to limit their emissions of greenhouse gases (GHG). The limits have been set with reference to 1990 emission levels. Column "Baseline Emissions -1990" of Table 1 lists the historic emissions for all Annex B regions, while column "Nominal Reduction -OLD" provides the reduction targets as originally foreseen by the Protocol.
The reduction targets with respect to 1990 are only nominal in the sense that they apply to historic emission levels. Since these targets will not become legally binding before the Kyoto commitment period (2008 Kyoto commitment period ( -2012 , the appropriate reference for the effective cutback requirements are the business-as-usual (BaU) emissions during the commitment period.
Column "Baseline Emissions -2010" reports the projected BaU emissions for the central year 2010 based on the reference scenario of the most recent International Energy Outlook (IEO 2001) by the U.S. Department of Energy. Except for the economies in transition, which include Eastern and Central Europe (EEC) as well as the Former Soviet Union (FSU), the nominal commitments translate into much more stringent reduction requirements, since industrialized countries are projected to have economic growth accompanied by a considerable increase in GHG emissions from fossil fuel combustion. For example, Australia and New Zealand (AUN) receive emission rights that are roughly 7 % higher than their 1990 reference emission levels, but in 2010 they will nevertheless face an effective cutback requirement of nearly 28 % vis-à-vis their BaU emissions. Apparently, the economies in transition have been endowed with emission entitlements under the Kyoto Protocol that are well in excess of their anticipated future BaU emissions.
2 As will be elaborated below, the availability of these excess emissions, referred to as "hot air", will crucially affect the potential compliance costs of OECD countries under the Kyoto Protocol.
Column "Absolute Cutback -OLD" converts the effective percentage reduction into absolute cutback requirements. An assessment of 4 In the aftermath of U.S. withdrawal, the climate change negotiations at Bonn and Marrakesh softened the reduction targets to remaining Annex B countries by conceding substantial credits for carbon dioxide sinks, namely forests and agricultural soils that store the greenhouse gas. Columns "NEW" in Table 1 show that these sink credits considerably water down the provisions of the Protocol.
To summarize: The Kyoto Protocol comes at no costs to ratifying parties, because it effectively boils down to business-as-usual without binding emission constraint.
We simply see what standard economic theory predicts.
3. At second glance: Kyoto is different from BaU but not much!
Market power and baseline projections
A more thorough assessment of the Kyoto Protocol reveals two major uncertainties that warrant caution against our simple back-on-the-envelope calculation.
First, the assumption of perfectly competitive permit markets where the international permit price falls to zero and emission sales do not create any revenues seems to be implausible (Hahn (1984) , Ellerman and Wing (2000) , Woerdman (2000) ). In general, the likelihood of market power increases if the number of participants is smaller or if the size of some participants is larger than neo-classical firm-to-firm trading with many participants.
Article 17 of the Kyoto Protocol creates an intergovernmental emissions trading market next to or instead of firm trading, so it is uncertain whether firms or governments will participate in international emissions trading. In the case of firm-to-firm trading, the scope for market power seems rather limited. However, it is unlikely that as the dominant supplier of emission rights due to large hot air entitlements the FSU will give up market power by leaving permit trade to its domestic firms. On the demand side, competitive behavior seems to be the 4 It has been agreed that the use of emissions trading "shall be supplemental to domestic action and domestic action shall thus constitute a significant element of the effort made by each Party .... to meet its quantified emission limitation and reduction commitments ..." (UNFCCC 2001) . The undefined term "significant" gives sufficient leeway for comprehensive trading. The restrictive position by the EU with respect to the permissible scope of emissions trading between industrialized countries has no longer been held up since the Bonn conference. There are no concrete caps on the share of emissions reductions a country can meet through the purchase of permits from other industrialized countries, nor are there caps on the amount of permits it can sell. appropriate assumption. Either firms of OECD countries may be allowed to engage in emissions trading directly 5 , or because -under the assumption of Party-to-Party tradingcoordination of several individual OECD countries within a demand cartel seems rather difficult. As a monopolist, FSU will reduce its permit supply and charge a mark-up over its marginal abatement costs (which are zero for hot air) to maximize profits. The international permit price will no longer be zero (as in the competitive case above) imposing non-zero compliance costs on industrialized countries with positive cutback requirements.
Second, a different perspective on how economies and emissions could evolve in the future might imply an effective demand in emission rights vis-a-vis a situation with an excess permit supply as suggested by Table 1 . Since abatement costs associated with the implementation of the Kyoto emission constraints crucially depend on the business-as-usual (BaU) projections for GDP and emissions, any careful analysis of the potential costs associated with the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol requires sensitivity analysis with respect to alternative baselines.
Assessing the costs of Kyoto
Market power and alternative baseline projections could significantly alter the economic costs of implementing Kyoto such that our initial conclusion might fail. Our main interest, then, is to assess how much the implied costs for major Annex B parties differ from zero when market power and alternative baselines are taken into account. In order to obtain such cost estimates we make use of a computable general equilibrium model of world trade and energy use. The general equilibrium approach provides a consistent and comprehensive framework for studying price-dependent interactions between the energy system and the rest of the economy. This is important since carbon abatement policies not only cause direct adjustments on fossil fuel markets but also produce indirect spillovers to other markets which in turn feed back to the economy. Therefore, computable general equilibrium models have become the standard tool for the analysis of the economy-wide impacts of greenhouse gas abatement policies on resource allocation and the associated implications for incomes of economic agents (Bergmann 1990 , Grubb et al. 1993 , Weyant 1999 .
5
See e.g. the plans of the EU commission to implement an EU internal trading system starting in 2005 with firm-to-firm trading across energy-intensive industries (COM 2000) .
The concrete multi-sector, multi-region model underlying our analysis has been widely used in the past to quantify the economic impacts of GHG abatement (Böhringer 2000 , Rutherford and Paltsev 2000 , Böhringer 2002 , Böhringer and Löschel 2002 . In the standard model version, all factor and commodity markets are assumed to be competitive. For our simulations, we drop this assumption with respect to permit trade and treat FSU as a monopoly supplier of permits. Profit-maximizing behavior then entails the equalization of marginal abatement cost and perceived marginal revenue, which implies that the permit price set by FSU is a markup on marginal cost. Obviously, the markup rate is a decreasing function of the price elasticity of permit demand. Since the concrete formula for the endogenous price elasticity is intractable analytically, we represent the mark-up in the model as an export tariff which drives a wedge between the international permit price and the marginal abatement costs in FSU. The mark-up has the same effect as a quota on the sales of permits where the quota rents accrue to FSU. In order to determine the optimal tariff or quota numerically, we raise the tariff of FSU in sufficiently small steps and then identify that rate which maximizes its welfare.
For the sake of brevity, we abstain here from a comprehensive description of the model algebra and its parameterization, which are available as a download from ftp://ftp.zew.de/pub/zew-docs/div/rio+10.pdf. In our simulations, we measure the economic and environmental consequences of abatement policies with respect to the BaU situation in 2010. Table 2 For a detailed discussion of the sources and magnitude of terms-of-trade effects from carbon abatement see Böhringer and Rutherford (2002). work primarily through the decline of international fuel prices following the drop in energy demand under emission reduction policies: As a net fuel importer, EEC benefits from cheaper energy imports, while FSU and ROW, which are net fuel exporters, are negatively affected.
Converting the percentage changes in consumption into payments per capita, the specific costs for abating OECD regions range from 23 USD/capita of EUR to 162 USD/capita for CAN. The compliance costs for the U.S. amounts to 92 USD. As we can see from column NTRout_OLD, non-compliance of the U.S. leaves the remaining OECD countries with considerable costs although fuel exporting regions AUN and, particularly, CAN benefit from U.S. withdrawal through a smaller drop in world energy prices.
U.S. withdrawal has triggered two further concretions to the Kyoto Protocol. On the one hand, a generous accounting of carbon sink credits has been approved. 7 On the other hand, parties have implicitly agreed on unrestricted Annex B emissions trading.
The scenario NTRout_NEW shows that sink credits considerably reduce compliance costs, but the effective financial burden is still significant (with up to 90 USD per capita for AUN) if regions meet their targets through domestic action. In line with the decrease in compliance costs, global environmental effectiveness drops towards zero when we incorporate step-for-step the changes to the initial Protocol.
Based on the quantitative evidence from Table 2 , we conclude that Kyoto is different from BaU but not much. Standard economic theory, however, casts doubt that Kyoto will go beyond symbolic policy.
Climate protection corresponds to the voluntary provision of a global public good, exhibiting severe incentive problems. Moreover, the benefits of emission abatement arise in the far distant future, while abatement costs have to be borne by the current generations. Short-to medium-run rational policy making, hence, suggests that countries not enter an international environmental agreement which causes larger adjustment costs.
In 
A.1 Production
Within each region (indexed by the subscript r), each producing sector (indexed interchangeable by i and j) is represented by a single-output producing firm which chooses input and output quantities in order to maximize profits. Firm behavior can be construed as a two-stage procedure in which the firm selects the optimal quantities of primary factors k (indexed by f) and intermediate inputs x from other sectors in order to minimize production costs given input prices and some production level Y = ϕ (k,x).
The second stage, given an exogenous output price, is the selection of the output level Y to maximize profits. The firm's problem is then: 
where Π denotes the profit functions, C the cost functions which relate the minimum possible total costs of producing Y to the positive input prices, technology parameters, and the output quantity Y, and p and w are the prices for goods and factors, respectively.
Production of each good takes place according to constant elasticity of substitution (CES) production functions, which exhibit constant returns to scale. Therefore, the output price equals the per-unit cost in each sector, and firms make zero profits in equilibrium (Euler's Theorem). Profit maximization under constant returns to scale implies the equilibrium condition: 
and the demand for factor f in sector i is:
The profit functions possess a corresponding derivative property (Hotelling's Lemma): 
The model captures the production of commodities by aggregate, hierarchical (or nested) constant elasticity of substitution (CES) production functions that characterize the technology through substitution possibilities between capital, labor, energy and material (nonenergy) intermediate inputs (KLEM). Two types of production functions are employed: those for fossil fuels (in our case v = COL, CRU, GAS) and those for non-fossil fuels (in our case n = EIS, ELE, OIL, ROI). 
with σ KLE = 1/(1-ρ KLE ) the elasticity of substitution between energy and the primary factor aggregate and θ the input (Leontief) coefficient. Finally, at the third level, capital and labor factor inputs trade-off with a constant elasticity of substitution 
As to the formation of the energy aggregate E, we employ several levels of nesting to represent differences in substitution possibilities between primary fossil fuel types as well as substitution between the primary fossil fuel composite and secondary energy, i.e. electricity.
The energy aggregate is a CES composite of electricity and primary energy inputs FF with
at the top nest:
The primary energy composite is defined as a CES function of coal and the composite of refined oil and natural gas with elasticity σ COA = 1/(1-ρ COA ). The oil-gas composite is assumed to have a simple Cobb-Douglas functional form with value shares given by θ :
( ) 
[10]
Figure A.1: Nesting structure of non-fossil fuel production Fossil fuel resources v are modeled as graded resources. The structure of production of fossil fuels is given in Figure A. 2. It is characterized by the presence of a fossil fuel resource in fixed supply. All inputs, except for the sector-specific resource R, are aggregated in fixed proportions at the lower nest. Mine managers minimize production costs subject to the technology constraint: 
The resource grade structure is reflected by the elasticity of substitution between the fossil fuel resource and the capital-labor-energy-material aggregate in production. The substitution elasticity between the specific factor and the Leontief composite at the top level is
). This substitution elasticity is calibrated in consistency with an exogenously given supply elasticity of fossil fuel ε vr according to We now turn to the derivation of the factor demand functions for the nested CES production functions, taking into account the duality between the production function and the cost function The total cost function that reflects the same production technology as the CES production function for e.g. value added KL in non-fossil fuel production given by [8] 
where PK and PL are the per-unit factor costs for the industry including factor taxes if applicable. The price function for the value-added aggregate at the third level is:
In order to determine the variable input coefficient for capital and labor a nr 
with θ nr the KLE value share in total production. The variable input coefficient for e.g. labor is then: 
A.2 Households
In each region, private demand for goods and services is derived from utility maximization of a representative household subject to a budget constraint given by the income level INC. The agent is endowed with the supplies of the primary factors of production (natural resources used for fossil fuel production, labor and capital) and tax revenues. In our comparative-static framework, overall investment demand is fixed at the reference level. The household's problem is then:
where W is the welfare of the representative household in region r, d denotes the final demand for commodities, k is the aggregate factor endowment of the representative agent and TR are total tax revenues. Household preferences are characterized by a CES utility function.
As in production, the maximization problem in 
where the elasticity of substitution between energy and non-energy composites is
given by σ C = 1/(1-ρ C ), the elasticity of substitution within the fossil fuel aggregate by σ FE = 1/(1-ρ FE ), and θ j are the value shares in non-fossil fuel consumption. The structure of final demand is presented in Figure A with C the aggregate household consumption in region r and PC its associated price. 
A.3 Foreign Trade
All commodities are traded in world markets and characterized by product differentiation. There is imperfect transformability (between exports and domestic sales of domestic output) and imperfect substitutability (between imports and domestically sold domestic output). Bilateral trade flows are subject to export taxes, tariffs and transportation costs and calibrated to the base year 1995. There is an imposed balance of payment constraint to ensure trade balance, which is warranted through flexible exchange rates, incorporating the benchmark trade deficit or surplus for each region.
On the output side, two types of differentiated goods are produced as joint products for sale in the domestic markets and the export markets, respectively. The allocation of output
between domestic sales D and international sales X is characterized by a constant elasticity of transformation (CET) function. Hence, firms maximize profits subject to the constraint:
with σ tr = 1/(1 + η) the transformation elasticity.
Regarding imports, the standard Armington convention is adopted in the sense that imported and domestically produced goods of the same kind are treated as incomplete substitutes (i. e. wine from France is different from Italian wine). The aggregate amount of each (Armington) good A is divided among imports and domestic production:
In this expression Given an emission constraint producers as well as consumers must pay this price on the emissions resulting from the production and consumption processes. Revenues coming from the imposition of the carbon constraint are given to the representative agent. The total cost of Armington inputs in production and consumption that reflects the CES production technology in [25] but takes CO2 emission restrictions into account is:
with a i the carbon emissions coefficient for fossil fuel i and τ the shadow price of CO 2 in region r associated with the carbon emission restriction:
where 2 r CO is the endowment of carbon emission rights in region r.
A.5 Zero Profit and Market Clearance Conditions
The equilibrium conditions in the model are zero profit and market clearance conditions. Zero profit conditions as derived in [2] require that no producer earns an "excess" profit in equilibrium. The value of inputs per unit activity must be equal to the value of outputs. The zero profit conditions for production, using the variable input coefficient derived above, is:
The market clearance conditions state that market demand equals market supply for all inputs and outputs. 
with PA the price of the Armington composite. π ir Z is the per unit zero profit function with Z the name assigned to the associated production activity. 
with PD the domestic commodity price. Export supply equals import demand across all trading partners:
with PX the export price. Aggregate import supply equals total import demand:
where PM is the import price.
Primary factor endowment equals primary factor demand:
An equilibrium is characterized by a set of prices in the different goods and factor markets such that the zero profit and market clearance conditions stated above hold.
A.6 International Permit Trade and Monopolistic Permit Supply
Under competitive permit trading, all countries can import or export CO 2 permits considering the international permit price as exogenous. The zero-profit condition for export activities of country r is given as weak inequality:
where P is the international permit price, τ r reflects the domestic carbon price (see [28] ) and CEXP r is the associated dual variable, which indicates the activity level of CO 2 exports from region r . Likewise, the zero-profit condition for import activities of country r is given by:
[38]
where CIMP r is the associated dual variable, which indicates the activity level of CO 2 imports in region r.
The market clearance condition for tradable permits is:
[39]
where P -the international permit price -is the associated dual variable.
Monopolistic permit supply is characterized as a situation where one country -in our case FSU -has supply power in the permit market while all other countries behave as price takers. The monopolist sets the permit price as a markup on its marginal abatement costs to maximize profits (with the usual inverse relationship between the markup rate and the price elasticity of permit demand). Given the complexity of functional forms in our CGE framework, it is not possible to derive an algebraic formula for the markup rate. We therefore represent the markup in the model as an export tariff which drives a wedge between the international permit price and the marginal abatement costs in FSU:
(1 ) 0
[40]
The markup is equivalent to a quota on the sales of permits where the quota rents accrue to FSU. In order to determine the optimal tariff or quota numerically, we raise the tariff of FSU in sufficiently small steps and then identify that rate which maximises its welfare in terms of real consumption C. 
A.7 Overview of Elasticities

Appendix C: Baseline Projections -Forward Calibration
The magnitude and distribution of abatement costs associated with the implementation of the Kyoto emission constraints crucially depend on the business-as-usual (BaU) projections for GDP, fuel prices, energy efficiency improvements, etc. In our comparative-static framework, we infer the BaU economic structure of the model's regions for the year 2010 using most recent projections by the U.S. Department of Energy (IEO 2001) for GDP growth, fossil fuel production, and future energy prices. We incorporate autonomous energy efficiency improvement factors which scale energy demand functions to match the exogenous IEO emission forecasts. The concrete forward calibration of the model entails three steps.
First, we fix the time profile of fossil fuel supplies from the model's regions to the exogenous baseline projections by making supplies inelastic and scaling sector-specific resources with the exogenous growth rates in fossil fuel production. This allows us to partially control the emission profile from the supply side. Within the BaU calculation, we endogenously adjust the resource endowments of fossil fuels to calibrate the model to given exogenous target prices for fossil fuels. At the same time we incorporate exogenous, regionspecific GDP growth rates to scale the labor and capital stock of our static model.
Second, we incorporate exogenous autonomous energy efficiency improvements (AEEI) to match the exogenous carbon emission profiles as provided by IEO. The AEEI reflects the rate of change in energy intensity, i.e. the ratio of energy consumption over gross domestic product, holding energy prices constant. It is a measure of all non-price induced changes in gross energy intensity including technical developments that increase energy efficiency as well as structural changes.
Third, we recalibrate fossil fuel supply functions locally to exogenous estimates of supply elasticities. The last step assures empirical reaction of fossil fuel production to policy induced changes in world energy prices of fuels.
To account for the importance of exogenous baseline projections, the model can be calibrated to alternative data sources in an automated way. In the current set-up, one can perform sensitivity analysis with respect to the three different core scenarios of IEO: low economic growth, reference case, and high economic growth.
